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This paper attempts to improve the understanding and 
measurement of decentralization and its relationship 
with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done 
by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such 
relationship as well as using superior and more defensible 
measures of both decentralization in its various 
dimensions as well as corruption for a sample of 182 
countries. It is the first paper that treats various tiers 
of local governments (below the inter-mediate order 
of government) as the unit of comparative analysis. 
In contrast, previous analyses erroneously focused on 
subnational governments as the unit of analysis which 
yields invalid cross-country comparisons. By pursuing 
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rigorous econometric analysis, the paper demonstrates 
that decentralization, when properly measured to mean 
moving government closer to people by empowering local 
governments, is shown to have significant negative effect 
on the incidence of corruption regardless of the choice of 
the estimation procedures or the measures of corruption 
used. In terms of various dimensions of decentralized 
local governance, political decentralization matters even 
when we control for fiscal decentralization. Further voice 
(political accountability) is empirically shown to be more 
important in combating corruption than exit options 
made available through competition among jurisdictions.Decentralization (localization) and corruption:
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During the past two decades, a silent revolution has swept the globe and a large num-
ber of industrial and developing countries have pursued localization/decentralization
reforms (see Boadway and Shah, 2009, Shah, 1998, for motivations for such a
change). The reform agenda has been pursued through varying combinations of
political, administrative and ﬁscal decentralization initiatives. These reforms have
proven to be controversial. This is because localization is perceived both as a solu-
tion to problems, such as a dysfunctional public sector, lack of voice and exit, as well
as a source of new problems, such as capture by local elite, aggravation of macroe-
conomic management due to lack of ﬁscal discipline and perverse ﬁscal behavior by
sub-national units.
The impact of localization on corruption (deﬁned as the abuse of public oﬃce for
private gain or exercise of oﬃcial powers against public interest) is an area of growing
interest inviting much controversy and debate. However, the empirical literature on
this subject is scant, and much of the discussion is grounded in selective anecdotal
evidence at the micro or macro level. In this paper we use new cross-country data
on decentralization and corruption to synthesize and strengthen the empirical foun-
dations of this debate by trying to isolate the role of decentralized decision making
in creating an enabling environment for an accountable public sector.
This paper represents a major departure from existing literature. The existing
literature uses subnational governance as an indicator of decentralization. This is
clearly indefensible as provinces and states in federal countries are typically larger
than nation states in many unitary countries. Therefore simply shifting responsi-
bilities to intermediate tier may not represent strengthened local decision making.
This paper overcomes this problem by focusing on decentralized local governance
and capturing its myriad dimensions- political, ﬁscal and administrative into com-
posite indexes for a worldwide sample of 182 countries (see Ivanyna and Shah, 2010,
for details on the underlying data and their aggregation).
The paper further utilizes improved measures on the incidence of corruption.
We use three diﬀerent datasets for this purpose, two of which have not been used
before in similar studies. As a base measure of corruption we use Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index, which is an aggregate index based on
the opinion of country experts. Further, with the help of Global Corruption Barom-
eter Survey, which is also conducted by the Transparency International, we measure
corruption - its frequency and amount - at the household level for 71 countries with
more than 55 thousands households covered. Our third dataset is the World Bank
Enterprises Survey, which covers 99 countries, and provides micro-level data on cor-
ruption - both frequency and amount of bribery - for more than 80,000 ﬁrms in
diﬀerent industries. Therefore, our research on corruption and decentralization ex-
tends both to micro- and macro-level data, and encompasses both households and
businesses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of conceptual
and empirical literature. The dataset on decentralization is described in Section 3,
and various measures of corruption, which we use in this paper, are presented in
Section 7. This is followed by a discussion on empirical model and variables in
2Section 5. Section ?? presents empirical results and a concluding section presents
the main ﬁndings and limitations of current research.
The paper concludes that decentralization (localization) has signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect on the incidence of corruption in the majority of our settings. Empowering
local governments reduces frequency of bribery and amount of bribes paid to govern-
ment oﬃcials both by households and by ﬁrms. Political decentralization matters
even when ﬁscal side of decentralization is controlled for. The empirical results pre-
sented here further demonstrate that voice (local accountability) matters more than
exit (interjurisdictional competition) in combating corruption.
2 How decentralization aﬀects corruption: A brief
survey of of the theoretical and empirical liter-
ature
A brief review of the conceptual and empirical literature is presented in this section
to serve as a background for the empirical framework results subsequently reported
in this paper.
2.1 Theoretical perspectives
Various authors have presented diverse perspectives on the role of localization in
combating corruption. First we review various arguments advanced to support
the view that decentralization may worsen corruption. Then we turn to the ar-
guments for decentralization as a tool to restrain bureaucrats. Refer to Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2005) for detailed literature survey of the topic.
2.1.1 Localization breeds corruption
It has been argued that localization brings oﬃcials in close contact with citizens
promoting personalism, and a higher degree of discretion leading to safeguard of in-
dividual citizens needs at the expense of public interest. It also leads to weakening
of monitoring, controls and audits by central agencies thereby creating opportuni-
ties for corruption (Tanzi (1995), Prud’homme (1994)). Treisman (1999) has argued
that ﬁscal decentralization leads to overgrazing by police forces reporting to vari-
ous orders of government and by regional politicians as they yield strong inﬂuence
over central institutions of accountability in governance. Several authors have ar-
gued that political decentralization promotes higher incidence of corruption through
the involvement of a larger number of oﬃcials in dealing with potential investors
e.g. feudal lords and oligarchs (Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Blanshard and Schleifer
(2000)) and by interest group capture where feudals and oligarchs dominate local
political scene (Shah (1998)).
2.1.2 Localization limits opportunities for corruption
A growing body of conceptual literature, on the other hand, argues that localiza-
tion oﬀers potential for greater accountability by moving the decision making closer
3to people. Arguments that have been advanced to support the positive impact
of decentralization in reducing corruption include: enhanced accountability and re-
duced corruption in view of competition among local governments (Weingast (1995),
Arikan (2004)); exit and voice mechanisms at the local level; higher level of infor-
mation (Seabright (1996), Boadway and Shah (2009)); lower expected gains from
corruption but higher probability of detection and punishment at the local level
(Carbonara (1999), Wildasin (1995)); enhanced transparency (Ahlin (2000)), and
lower transaction costs for citizens and improved countervailing institutions (Boad-
way and Shah (2009)).
Thus the conceptual literature is inconclusive regarding the impact of decentral-
ization on corruption. This literature suggests that such an impact is better assessed
through empirical work on this question.
2.2 Empirical perspectives
The empirical literature on this subject also presents diverse perspectives - both
negative and positive.
2.2.1 Negative impacts
Treisman (2000) from analysis of cross-country data concluded that decentralized
countries have higher perceived corruption and poorer service delivery performance
in public health services. A recent study by Fan et al. (2009) using a cross section
data of eighty countries ﬁnds that in countries with a large number of government or
administrative tiers and (given local revenues) a larger number of public employees,
reported bribery was more frequent.
2.2.2 Positive impacts
A number of studies provide support for the positive inﬂuence of decentralization
in controlling corruption. Crook and Manor (2000) examined the process of politi-
cal decentralization in India (Karnatka state), Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana
and found that decentralization led to enhanced transparency and reduced incidence
of corruption. They conclude that decentralization reduces grand theft but increases
petty corruption in the short run but in the long run, both may go down. Fiszbein
(1997) based upon a review of political decentralization in Colombia concluded that
competition for political oﬃce opened the door for responsible and innovative leader-
ship that in turn became the driving force behind capacity building, improved service
delivery and reduced corruption at the local level. Kuncoro (2000) found that in In-
donesia, administrative decentralization led to lower corruption as ﬁrms relocated to
areas with lower bribes. Wade (1997) found that over-centralized top down manage-
ment accompanied by weak communications and monitoring system contributed to
corruption and poor delivery performance for canal irrigation in India. Huther and
Shah (1998) using international cross-section and time series data found that ﬁscal
decentralization was associated with enhanced quality of governance as measured
by citizen participation, political and bureaucratic accountability, social justice, im-
proved economic management and reduced corruption. Arikan (2004) reconﬁrms
4the same result. De Mello and Barenstein (2001) based upon cross-country data
concluded that tax decentralization was positively associated with improved quality
of governance. Fisman and Gatti (2002) found a negative relations between ﬁscal
decentralization and corruption. Gurgur and Shah (2002) identify major drivers of
corruption in order to isolate the eﬀect of decentralization. In a sample of industrial
and non-industrial countries, lack of service orientation in the public sector, weak
democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal
bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making are identiﬁed as the major
causes of corruption. For a non-industrial countries sample, drivers for corruption
are lack of service orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions and
closed economy. Decentralization has a greater negative impact on corruption in uni-
tary countries than in federal countries. They concluded that decentralization was
conﬁrmed here to support greater accountability in the public sector and reduced
corruption. Dincer et al. (2006) using data for US states ﬁnds that localization by
inducing yardstick competition discourages corruption.
3 Measuring decentralization
Decentralization attempts to move public sector decision making closer to the peo-
ple. The existing literature has treated decentralization to be synonymous with
subnational governance. This is clearly an indefensible view as intermediate or-
ders of government in large federal countries may be farther removed from people
than the central government in smaller unitary states. Therefore it would be in-
appropriate to compare provinces in Canada or states in Brazil, India, or the USA
with municipalities, say, in Greece. After all, central governments of small countries
(Monaco, Lichtenstein, etc.) can themselves be considered as fully-decentralized lo-
cal governments. In view of this local government serves as a better unit of analysis
for comparative analysis of decentralization.
As an aside, another example of inappropriate choice of units for comparative
analysis is in Fan et al. (2009), where the authors create a dummy variable, which
is equal to 1 when the executive bodies at the lowest tier of government are elected.
As a result, say Bangladesh gets 0, and Indonesia gets 1. However, the average
population of a lowest unit in Indonesia is about 0.5 million, while in Bangladesh
(according to the deﬁnitions in the paper) it is about 100 people. There are elected
executive bodies in Bangladesh at a level of units with population even less than 0.5
million, which implies that Bangladesh may be more politically decentralized than
Indonesia.
Once local government is selected as the unit for comparative analysis, one must
also pay attention to the structure of local government as local government is not
a monolithic entity in most countries. If horizontal interjurisdictional competition
(exit) is conjectured to be the outcome of increased decentralization than it is the
mobility of residents and businesses - both inside a country and internationally,
and availability of options for exit that should matter when comparing units of
government in diﬀerent countries. For both arguments - be it either voice or exit -
the administrative structure of local government is of paramount importance .
We adopt the following general structure of a government. General government
5(GG) consists of 3 parts: Central Government (CG), State Government (SG) -
though many countries do not have that part, and Local Government (LG). Each
part consists of governmental units (in case of CG - only 1 unit), which are united
into 1 or more tiers (in case of CG - 1 tier). So far as data permits, Social Security
Funds are consolidated with an appropriate part of GG.
Deﬁnition Governmental unit - public institutional entity, which has the following
properties:
1. It is separate corporate entity, which may own assets and incur liabilities, sue
and be sued. To say simpler, it has its own budget.
2. It has planning, legislative and executive powers.
Note that this deﬁnition is stronger (imposes more requirements for an institution to
be a unit of government) than the one of D. Treisman used in Fan et al. (2009) and
for his dataset.1 At the same time, Deﬁnition 3 is weaker (imposes less restrictions)
that the one used in (UCLG, 2008). There, the public entity is a governmental unit
only if it has elected council,2 while we allow for governmental bodies, which are
fully appointed by an upper-tier government.3
Deﬁnition Tier - a system of governmental units, which covers the whole territory
of a country.
Tiers are needed to calculate the average population of LG (or SG or SNG - subna-
tional) administrative unit. For instance, if LG in a country with the population P
has 3 tiers (X1 units on 1st tier, X2 units on 2nd, X3 units on 3rd) then the average
population of LG unit is 3P/(X1 + X2 + X3) - countries are penalized for having







where LG pop is the average population of an LG unit, T is the number of tiers in
the country, P is its population, and Xi is the number of LG units at the i’th tier.
Deﬁnition Local government - the lowest level governmental units (may be grouped
into several tiers). Higher tiers of LG should not have substantial powers, and are
used for coordination between lowest level units.
Deﬁnition State government - the second highest (after CG) level of governmental
units. It should have substantial ﬁscal and administrative powers.
1The deﬁnition is the following: A is a governmental unit if (a) it has government or at least a
governor, and (b) it represents level of general administration, not a particular service. Further, set
of A’s of the same type represent a ”tier” if a higher ”tier” is at least in some parts is subdivided
into A-type units
2They themselves relax this deﬁnition for some countries
3In fact, election of council is one of our decentralization variables
6Deﬁnitions of LG and SG are quite vague. In particular, it is not always clear if
some intermediate tier should be ascribed to LG or SG. IMF’s GFS does not give
a precise deﬁnition either, which results into countries deciding for themselves and
reporting corresponding data. As a result, France with 3 tiers has only LG, and
Spain - which in many ways has similar administrative structure - has 1 tier of SG,
and 2 tiers of LG. Giving more precise deﬁnitions for LG and SG, which could be
applied to all countries, proves to be pretty diﬃcult. We cannot use responsibilities
by outlays (such as LG are responsible for municipal services, SG are not) or some
political variables, because the cross-country variation of these variables is too high,
and - precisely for this reason - we use many of them in our set of variables to obtain
decentralization index (measure). The way distinguish between LG and SG now is
the following: we approach each country separately, take whatever data is reported
for it, and penalize those countries, which include larger governmental units into LG
structure.
In addition to the decentralization variables themselves, dataset used here con-
tains a detailed information about administrative structure of every country. In
particular, we report which tiers of GG are ascribed to a local government, and
number of governmental units at each tier. Further, we calculate the average size
(in terms of population and area) of a local government in each country. The de-
scriptive statistics of administrative structure variables is reported in Table 4. In
particular, of the sample of 182 countries only 20 have state governments (SG),
while the rest of the countries have only local and central governments. 26% of the
countries have only 1 tier of local government, 46% have 2 tiers, while 23% and 6%
have 3 and 4 tiers correspondigly. The average population of a local government
unit (note that it accounts for a number of tiers) ranges from 1.4 thousands people
in Equatorial Guinea to 1.8 million people in Indonesia, with an country-average
population of 101 thousand people. The average area of a local government unit
ranges from 4.4 th. sq.m in Malta to 70 th. sq.km in Lybia (cross-country average
is 2.2 th. sq.km).
3.1 Decentralization variables
7Table 1: Decentralization variables used in regressions






1 - legislative safeguards against dismissal of LG coun-
cil by CG; 0.5 - LG can be dismissed under certain
circumstances (prescribed by law or constitution); 0 -
LG can be dismissed in an arbitrary situation. 0.25 or












Final value: average over all tiers considered; for each
tier: 1 - whole council is directly elected; 0.5 - council
is partly elected, partly appointed, council is elected
indirectly, LG are treated asymmetrically; 0 - council















Final value: average over all tiers considered; for each
tier: 1 - mayor is directly elected; 0.5 - mayor is in-
directly elected, does not exist, coexist with an ap-



















1 - obligatory referendum in case of certain gov’t deci-
sions (prescribed by law or constitution); 0.5 - obliga-
tory public approval in case of certain gov’t decisions
(public hearings, citizen assemblies); 0.25 - leg. pro-
visions for other forms of citizen participation (civil
councils, open LG sessions, possibility to submit peti-























Name Type Deﬁnition N Distribution
LG vertical gap Continuous:
0-100
Grants from other govt’s (same- or upper-tier, also
















1 - LG regulates fully (sets base and rate) at least
one major tax (property, income, or sales tax); 0.5
- LG partly regulates (sets rate or base in CG de-
ﬁned boundaries, or only after CG approval) at least
one major tax, or fully regulates some fees and minor
taxes; 0 - no administration of major taxes, partial












1 - at least half of transfers (to LG budgets from
same- or upper-tier governments) are unconditional
and formula-based; 0.5 - quarter to half of transfers
are unconditional and formula-based; 0 - all transfers
are either conditional or discretionary; 0.25 or 0.75 -











1 - borrowing is not regulated by CG; 0.5 - borrowing
only from CG or under CG approval or regulation; 0 -






Note: Deﬁnitions and characteristics of decentralization variables are shown. Year of the data - 2005. Datasource: Ivanyna
and Shah (2010). Abbreviations used: LG - local government, CG - central government, GG - general government.
9The descriptions, deﬁnitions and sample distributions of decentralization vari-
ables used in regressions are reported in Table ??. They can be grouped into 2
diﬀerent dimensions of empowering local governments. For the full description of
our dataset refer to our working paper Ivanyna and Shah (2010).
• Political decentralization: Does LG have means to provide policymaking,
which is independent from CG or SG - central or state government?
The following variables are used to characterize political decentralization:
– LG independence(lg indep): Can CG or SG dissolve LG council4 or mayor5
without any reason? Can it dissolve LG for some speciﬁc reason?
– LG legislative election(lg legel): Are legislative bodies at the local level
elected or appointed? Is the truth somewhere in between? (e.g. part of
council members is appointed, part is elected, or members of councils are
elected from preapproved by CG list)
– LG executive election(lg exel): Are executive bodies at the local level
elected - directly or indirectly - or appointed?
– Direct democracy(lg dirdem): Are there legislation provisions for the el-
ements of direct democracy? (e.g. obligatory local referendums in case
of some LG decisions, direct citizen participation in decision making pro-
cess)
• Fiscal decentralization: Does LG have ﬁscal means to provide services it is
entitled to provide?
The following variables characterize ﬁscal decentralization:
– LG expenditures(lg expdec): What part of GG (general government) ex-
penditures is spent on local level?
This variable is central in our analysis, and our main decentralization
index is based on it. Obviously, it is not a perfect measurement of ex-
penditures freedom or potential of LG - a chunk of local expenditures
may be earmarked by CG for speciﬁc purposes. However, this variable is
what the actual data available dictates us to use. Besides, all contracts
are incomplete, and LG have always some autonomy over the money they
receive. For instance, if LG gets funding from CG to maintain schools
or roads, it is up to LG how to spend this money in a given boundaries
(say, buy extra computers vs. improve food quality in school cafeterias).
At the same time, CG’s direct expenditures on schools or roads would
completely omit LG’s inﬂuence.
– LG vertical gap(lg vergap): What part of LG revenues are grants from
higher-tier governments?
Vertical gap proxies ﬁscal dependence of LG on CG - if funds are trans-
ferred from a higher-tier government it means that the LG in question
4Here council is a general name for legislative bodies
5Here mayor is a general name for executive bodies
10may not have full autonomy over how to spend them. Grants can be
diﬀerent though: formula-based unconditional grant gives most freedom
to the LG, while earmarked grants give almost none. Therefore, vertical
gap alone does not tell us much about true ﬁscal autonomy of the LG.
– LG taxation autonomy (lg taxaut): Do LG have powers to regulate (set
rate and base, create new ones) local taxes? In other words, can LG raise
funds through taxation independently from CG?
– LG unconditional transfers (lg transf): Are grants from SG or CG (or
other LG, which is rare) formula-based? Are they unconditional? In
other words, if LG depends on grants, how likely is that their availability
does not depend on political situation, and how much discretion do LG
have over spending the money received?
– LG borrowing freedom (lg borrow): Can LG borrow money to satisfy their
needs? Can the borrowing be done without consent or regulation of CG?
Nine decentralization variables are depicted in Figure 1. Except for LG vertical
gap, the darker color of a country for some variable means it is more decentralized
in corresponding dimension (political, ﬁscal, or administrative). As expected, Eu-
ropean countries and North America score high in most cases. African and Middle
East countries are almost always at the lowest percentiles. Interestingly, Brazil is
in the top 50th percentile by all dimensions. At the same time, China scores low in
political decentralization, but very high in the ﬁscal one.
3.2 Decentralization indexes
Our main assumption is that decentralization should matter only when local gov-
ernments have some expenditure discretion, i.e. the ﬁscal decentralization variables
are dominant in our main measures of decentralization. Indeed, it is hard to believe
that local governments - however politically or administratively independent they
are from the center - have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on policymaking if their budget is
close to nothing. We test this assumption later by contrasting ﬁscal variables with
political ones, but our main measurement of decentralization - similarly to most
empirical studies of the subject - is based on ﬁscal indicators.
The main variable used in the economic literature6 to measure decentralization is
sub-national expenditure decentralization (SNG expenditures as % of GG expendi-
tures) , which was constructed by the World Bank based on the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics dataset. We update this variable for 2005, and add estimates for
the countries, which are not reported in GFS. The resulting variable - LG expendi-
ture decentralization (lg expdec) - is the basis for our decentralization index.
The way it is reported to IMF (or recorded in national accounts), expenditure
decentralization does not fully reﬂect the actual expenditure discretion that local
governments have. First, LG may be simple distributors of the funding transferred
to them from an upper-tier government, and have little choice over how the money
in their budget should be spent. If the LG vertical gap (diﬀerence between LG
6See for instance Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fan et al. (2009)
11LG  indepence LG  legislative election
LG  executive election LG  direct democracy
LG  expenditure decentralization LG  vertical gap
LG  unconditional transfers LG  taxation autonomy
LG  borrowing
Figure 1: Decentralization variables in 2005 - World Map
Note Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2010). Each country is colored according to value of
corresponding decentralization variable (see Table ?? for deﬁnitions). The lighter is the color of
the country the smaller value of decentralization variable in this country is. Shades of the color
(4 in each subﬁgure) correspond to 0-25th, 25-50th, 50-75th, 75-100th percentiles of the world’s
distribution.
12expenditures and LG non-transfer revenues) is wide, and if the transfers from upper-
tier governments are earmarked and discretionary, the actual spending power of LG
may be much lower than it would be indicated by lg expdec. Second, even the own
revenues of LG (tax revenues or borrowed funds) may strongly depend on CG policy.
If LG are not allowed to regulate taxes without CG interference (usually in such
cases they receive a revenue-share of a tax, which is regulated by CG), then they
cannot fully rely on the revenues from these taxes, and their policy would still be
partly dependent on CG7
We adjust for the ﬁrst argument - that the real LG expenditure autonomy de-
pends on the vertical gap and the structure of intergovernmental grants - by deﬁning
LG expenditure discretion variable (lg expdiscr):
lg expdiscr = lg expdec ∗ (1 − lg vergap ∗ (0.75 − 0.5 ∗ lg transf)), (2)
Note from (2), that even if a country has widest possible vertical gap (1), and
smallest possible share of unconditional formula-based transfers (0) it still keeps
0.25 share of its original expenditure decentralization. This is to reﬂect the fact
that discretionary conditional grant from CG still gives more autonomy to the LG
than the direct spending of CG. At the same time, country with a positive vertical
gap and best possible set of transfers gets less than lg expdec - (1−0.25)∗lg vergap
share of it. This is to reﬂect the fact that even the best set of transfers does not
give LG as much ﬁscal independence as its own revenues.
To adjust for the second argument - that LG tax revenues should be accom-
panied with taxation regulation autonomy - we alter lg expdiscr by LG taxation
autonomy (lg taxaut). The formula for our main decentralization index (di main)
is the following:
di main = lg expdiscr ∗ (0.25 + 0.5 ∗ lg taxaut). (3)
Again, while the index penalizes those countries, where LG do not have taxation
autonomy, it is still positive for this countries (equal to 0.25 share of lg expdiscr)
reﬂecting the fact that own revenues do grant some degree of discretion to LG. At
the same time, countries with full taxation autonomy get an index, which is equal to
0.75 of lg expdiscr. This is to reﬂect the fact that in most countries LG tax revenues
are comprised of the own tax revenues and the tax shares, even if LG are allowed
to regulate some of the major taxes. It means that for these countries there is still
some inﬂuence of CG over LG spending decisions. The exact composition between
tax shares and own revenues varies from country to country, but the data on this
are only available for the most developed countries. In order for us to be able to
make comparisons in a wider sample of countries we use rougher dummy indicators,
and smooth them to avoid extremes.
If there is no data on lg taxaut, lg vergap or lg transf, then the worst possible
values are assumed: lg taxaut=lg transf =0, lg vergap=1. This is a reasonable as-
sumption since in most cases countries, which do not report this ﬁgures, have simply
7The degree of such dependence depends on speciﬁc institutional arrangements in tax sharing.
Of course, if the rules are prescribed in constitution, then the inﬂuence of CG should be minimal.
However, if CG chooses how much of the revenue should be alloted to LG, then it may condition






Figure 2: Index of decentralization 2005 - World Map
Note Source: Ivanyna and Shah (2010). Each country is colored according to its index of
decentralization, given by the formula (3). The lighter is the color the less decentralized the
country is.
nothing to report. Besides, these extreme values are eﬀectively smoothed in our ﬁnal
formula. At the same time, if our main decentralization variable lg expdec is not
available then the country is excluded from further analysis. As a result, the index
is built for 158 countries worldwide. Together they comprise 98% of the world’s
GDP, and 99% of the world’s population.
The Figure 2 depicts distribution of the decentralization index on the World
map. The darker the color of a country, the more decentralized it is. European
countries, North America, Brazil, China are the most decentralized. Countries from
Latin America, former USSR, and East Asia receive average decentralization index,
while Middle East and African countries are the least decentralized. Denmark (0.4),
China (0.35), Sweden (0.31), Finland (0.26), and Norway (0.22) have the ﬁve highest
scores.
4 Measuring the incidence of corruption
In our main estimation we use 5 diﬀerent measures of corruption. 2 of them are taken
from the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) survey,
2 - from the World Bank Enterprises Surveys (WBES) and the 5th is TI Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) - a measure, which is commonly used in empirical research
on corruption. The deﬁnitions of corruption variables are given in Table 2, and their
descriptive statistics are given in Table 4.
The Global Corruption Barometer is an annual survey of households conducted
by Transparency International, and commenced in 2003. The data we have is from
2005 - 55 thousands households were surveyed in 68 countries from all continents,
and all income groups. Apart from demographic characteristics of a respondent,
the GCB questionnaire have questions in the following groups: which sectors and
14Table 2: Measures of corruption
Name Type Source Deﬁnition Years obs. countr.
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timates of bribe paid divided by




informal gift binary: 0,
1
WBES Surveys 2002-05: maximum by
questions 40(v), 40(vi), 42(i);
Surveys 2006-09: maximum by
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Question 5: In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in this household paid bribe in any
form? Answers: 1) Yes; 2) No
Question 5.1: What was the approximate amount of money paid overall in bribes by your household
in the past 12 months? Answers: 1) Under 30 USD;... 11) 1000 USD and more
Question 42(i)-j5: In any of the tax inspections or meetings was a gift or informal payment
expected or requested? Answers: 1) Yes; 2) No
Question 40(v)-j12: In reference to the application for an import license, was an informal gift or
payment expected or requested? Answers: 1) Yes; 2) No
Question 40(vi)-j15: In reference to the application for an operating license, was an informal gift
or payment expected or requested? Answers: 1) Yes; 2) No
Question 39-j7: We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal
payments to public oﬃcials to ”get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations,
services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales do establishments like this one pay in
informal payments or gifts to public oﬃcials for this purpose? Answer: % of sales (0-100)
Note Measures of corruption used in the paper are described. Abbreviations: TI GCB -
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer, TI CPI - Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index, WBES - World Bank Enterprises Surveys.
15institutions are most aﬀected by corruption (opinion of a respondent); which spheres
of life does corruption aﬀect most (opinion of a respondent); how is corruption
evolving over time (opinion of a respondent); how frequently do people bribe (real
facts from a respondent’s life); how much does it cost (real facts from a respondent’s
life); what form does bribery take (real facts from a respondent’s life).
Two measures of corruption that we use - paid bribe and bribe burden - utilize
a respondent’s answers about real facts from his/her life. For the ﬁrst measure,
a respondent is asked if he/she paid bribe during last 12 months. For the second
measure, the question is what was the amount of all bribes paid.8 The survey was
completely anonymous, and the rate of non-response on these questions is relatively
low (3.3% for paid bribe, 6.8% for bribe burden). Therefore, these measures provide
more or less objective assessments of corruption (at least, of petty corruption) level
among households in a country: the former one estimates the frequency of the
bribery, while the latter one estimates its burden in terms of GDP.
To capture the extent of corruption in the business world we utilize the World
Bank Enterprises Surveys dataset. WBES is a survey of ﬁrms from diﬀerent sec-
tors of economy (services, manufacturing, construction, etc.) with number of oﬃcial
employees more than 5. It is conducted annually in developing and countries in
transition (regular survey are being conducted since 2002). The questions that the
representatives of the ﬁrms are asked during an interview pertain to the ﬁrm’s gen-
eral characteristics and ﬁnancial indicators, the investment climate in a country,
where they operate, the state of infrastructure, labor market, degree of competition,
etc. The separate group of questions concerns business-government relations. This
group contains several questions about bribing governmental oﬃcials: are there any
informal gifts or payments expected or requested during certain kinds of interaction
between a ﬁrm and a government oﬃcial (e.g. tax inspections, obtaining operating
or import license, etc.); what percentage of annual sales goes to such gifts and pay-
ments; does a ﬁrm try to secure a contract with a government, and what percentage
of its value is paid back to government oﬃcials. All these questions concern real
experience that a ﬁrm had with a government.
We use two main measures of corruption from WBES. The ﬁrst one - informal
gift - captures frequency of bribery among the businesses in a country. informal gift
is equal to 1 if a responded told that an informal gift or payment was expected or
requested when the ﬁrm dealt with tax inspections, or operating licenses, or import
licenses. The second measure of corruption - bribe%sales - captures the burden of
bribery on a ﬁrm. It is equal to the percentage of annual sales that the ﬁrm spends
on informal gifts to ”get things done” with the government. This ﬁgure is directly
asked about in the survey. Similary to TI GCB, WBES is a completely anonymous
survey, and the rate of non-responce to the questions of our interest is quite low:
less than 3% for bribe%sales, and less than 2% for informal gift. Therefore, these
measures quite credibly reﬂect the situation with corruption among businesses in a
country.
As an alternative to our ”objective” (or ”factual”) measures of corruption, we
also use a measure, which is opinion-based. It is corruption perception - Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Transparency Index, which does not need intro-
8We then take this amount as a percentage of country’s GDP per capita
16duction for most of empirical economists. In short, this commonly and frequently
used index is a composite score of about 15 (may be diﬀerent each year) polls of
experts, expressing their opinion about the level of corruption in a given country.
This measure may obviously be subject to certain perceptional and ideological bi-
ases, image of a country in mass media, etc. The advantage of it, however, is it’s
availability for a large sample of countries (174 in 2005, 169 in 2007), and over a long
period of time (annually from 2001 to 2007, also for 1996, 1980-1985, 1988-1992).
The state of corruption in the world based on our 5 measurements is shown
in Table 3. As expected, developed countries are the least corrupted based on
any measure, while African and former Soviet Union countries are among the most
corrupted. There is big variation in level of corruption in the world. For example,
bribe burden in Singapore is virtually 0, while in Senegal people pay up to 14%
of GDP in bribes. In Spain ﬁrms spend 0.1% of their annual sales on unoﬃcial
payments to governmental oﬃcials, while in Paraguay this ﬁgure reaches 10%. In
Kyrgyzia about 85% contacts of the ﬁrms with governmental oﬃcials end up in
paying bribes, while in Namibia it is only 1.2%.
Table 3 also shows the distribution of the countries by income and region (see
World maps) for each measure. Comparing the distributions with the one for cor-
ruption perception, which is available for almost all countries and can be considered
representative, one can see that GCB sample (variables paid bribe and bribe burden)
is somewhat skewed towards high and upper middle income countries, with most
representation in Europe, CIS, Latin America and East Asia. At the same time, the
WBES sample (variables paid bribe and bribe burden) is somewhat skewed to lower
middle and low income countries, mostly in Africa, CIS, Eastern Europe and South
America. Analysis of all 4 corruption variables would therefore provide the most
objective picture.
5 Econometric speciﬁcations
Our goal is to identify empirical eﬀect of decentralization on corruption, where the
population of interest is the world’s countries. Our general approach is to regress:
corruption = β0 + β1 ∗ decentralization + other controls. (4)
β1 is coeﬃcient (coeﬃcients if we use several variables for decentralization) we are
interested in, provided the other factors which may aﬀect the relationship between
decentralization and corruption are properly controlled for. To cover as many ap-
pearances of corruption in a society as possible as well as to make our research robust
to small sample bias and sample selection we use 5 diﬀerent variables to measure
corruption. They are described in detail in Section 7. The distribution of these
variables drives several diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations of the equation 4.
In the case of paid bribe variable we have binary responses of individuals from
diﬀerent countries, 1 meaning that they paid bribe in the last 12 months, 0 meaning
that they did not. Therefore, we are estimating the probability of an individual i
17Table 3: Corruption in the world
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Note Corruption variables: see deﬁnitions of in Table 2. Maps: the darker the country the
greater is the value assigned to it (the more corrupted it is, except the case of corruption
perception). Distribution by income (World Bank’s classiﬁcation of countries): 1st row - # of
high income countries in the sample; 2nd row - upper middle income; 3rd row - lower-middle
income; 4th row - low income.
18from country j to pay bribe given our set of controls:
P(paid bribeij = 1) = P(β0 + β1 ∗ decentralizationj + β2 ∗ ind controlsi + (5)
+β4 ∗ country controlsj + uij > 0) = F(β0 + β1 ∗ decentralizationj +
+β2 ∗ ind controlsi + β4 ∗ countrycontrols j),
where i changes from 1 to Nj - number of individuals in the sample, which are resi-
dents of the country j; j changes from 1 to N - number of countries covered by the
survey. F is error u’s cumulative distribution function. In particular, our interest
is to ﬁnd how the probability changes with the changes in decentralization having
all other controls ﬁxed. Assuming that the errors uij are normally distributed the
natural way to estimate this probability is to use probit model (F becomes then a cu-
mulative function of a normal distribution). Note that decentralization variable(s)
are the same for all individuals from one country, and we use both individual-speciﬁc
and country-speciﬁc controls. In addition, we also ﬁt a linear probability model in
this case (ordinary OLS), since it is robust to the distribution of the error and
possible heteroscedasticity in the data.
Similar reasoning concerns the informal gift measure. This is also a dummy
variable, which is equal to 1 if a respondent ﬁrm maid or was requested to make
an informal present to a government oﬃcial in exchange of certain standardly pro-
vided service, and equal to 0 if the ﬁrm did not do it. Therefore, in this case we
are estimating the probability of a ﬁrm to make an informal gift (pay bribe) to a
government oﬃcial. The probit and the linear probability models are also used in
this case:
P(informal giftij = 1) = F(β0 + β1 ∗ decentralizationj + (6)
+β2 ∗ ind controlsi + β4 ∗ country controlsj)
The bribe burden measure varies from 0 for those who did not pay any bribes to
a maximum of 458% of country’s GDP per capita. The distribution of bribe burden
has clearly a corner solution at 0 (in fact, 86% of observations in the sample are
equal to 0). With such distribution of dependant variable the most appropriate way
is to estimate tobit cencored model with the lower limit set to 0:
bribe burden
∗
ij = β0 + β1 ∗ decentralizationj + (7)
+β2 ∗ ind controlsi + β4 ∗ country controlsj + uij,
uij| < controls >∼ Normal(0,σ
2),
bribe burdenij = max(0,bribe burden
∗
ij), (8)
where bribe burden∗ is a latent (unobservable) variable, <controls> are all right
hand side variables in the regression. For a comparison purpose we also estimate
usual OLS model in this case.
The variable bribe%sales is treated similarly to bribe burden. Indeed, most of
the ﬁrms in the sample (71%) report 0 as a percentage of annual sales that go for
informal payments to governemnt oﬃcials. Therefore, we again ﬁt tobit cencored
model with lower limit set to 0. As an alternative speciﬁcation, an ordinary OLS
model is also estimated.
19In the case of the corruption perception measure we use the standard OLS model.
This variable is close to continuous, and there is no censorship in the sample. There-
fore, OLS appears to be the most appropriate and straightforward way to estimate
the eﬀects of interest:
corruption perceptionj = β0 + β1 ∗ decentralizationj + β4 ∗ country controlsj + uj. (9)
Note that corruption perception is measured not at an individual but on a country
level. As usual, index j in equation 9 indicates that the observation is from country
j, but there are no individual-speciﬁc controls.
The descriptive statistics of all variables, which we use in our regressions are
given in Table 4. As it was mentioned before, the dependent variables are paid bribe,
bribe burden, informal gift, bribe%sales corruption perception - 5 diﬀerent measures
of corruption. The main variable which we use as a measure of decentralization is
decentralization index. Besides, we use several alternative measures (see Table 4).
Table 4: Variables used in regressions: Deﬁnitions, sources, summary statistics
Variable Deﬁnition Source Mean St.dev. Min Max
Corruption
paid bribe see Table 2 see Table 2 .11 .32 0 1
bribe burden see Table 2 see Table 2 1.23 11.7 0 458
informal gift see Table 2 see Table 2 .23 .42 0 1
bribe%sales see Table 2 see Table 2 1.67 5.9 9 300
corruption percep-
tion




see Section 3 equation (3) .05 .06 0 .35
decentralization in-
dex, aux.




.1 .11 0 .54
LG independence see Table 1 see Table 1 .24 .28 0 1
LG legislative elec-
tion
see Table 1 see Table 1 .8 .31 0 1
LG executive elec-
tion
see Table 1 see Table 1 .45 .35 0 1
LG direct democ-
racy
see Table 1 see Table 1 .22 .22 0 1
LG expenditures see Table 1 see Table 1 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.59
LG vertical gap see Table 1 see Table 1 44.5 24.4 0 100
LG taxation auton-
omy
see Table 1 see Table 1 .36 .37 0 1
LG unconditional
transfers
see Table 1 see Table 1 .36 .39 0 1
LG borrowing free-
dom
see Table 1 see Table 1 .51 .33 0 1
Administrative structure
1 LG tier 1 if LG has only 1 tier in a
country
various sources .26 .44 0 1
2 LG tiers 1 if LG has 2 tiers in a
country
various sources .46 .5 0 1
3 LG tiers 1 if LG has 3 tiers in a
country
various sources .22 .41 0 1
>3 LG tiers 1 if LG had 4 or more tiers
in a country
various sources .06 .24 0 1
LG population size average population of LG





101 175.5 1.4 1709
# units number of units (jurisdic-
tions) at all tiers of LG
various sources 4117 20635 3 250671
# units at tier 1 number of units at tier 1 of
LG
various sources 4056 20663 3 250671
# units at highest
tier
number of units at the
highest LG tier
various sources 1579 18839 1 250671
20Table 4: (continued)
Variable Deﬁnition Source Mean St.dev. Min Max
LG area average area of LG unit,
thds sq. km
various sources 2.1 6.9 0 70.38
Other country-speciﬁc controls
GDP per capita PPP units, 2005 WDI (World
Bank)
9548 14645 101 81777
log(GDP per
capita)




7.67 1.62 4.5 10.7
openness (exports + imports) as %




96.5 53.6 2 446




18.5 9.45 3.11 62.21
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.45 .25 0 .93




35.69 130.2 0.7 1303.7




.3 .46 0 1
protestant 1 if protestants is a major
religious group in a country
Pippa Norris
dataset
.21 .4 0 1
catholic 1 if catholics is a major re-
ligious group in a country
Pippa Norris
dataset
.29 .46 0 1
muslim 1 if muslims is a major re-
ligious group in a country
Pippa Norris
dataset
.28 .45 0 1
orthodox 1 if orthodox people is a




.07 .25 0 1
Individual-speciﬁc controls
male 1 if male - .48 .5 0 1
age 30 age under 30 - .31 .46 0 1
age 30-50 age between 30 and 50 - .42 .45 0 1
age 50-65 age between 50 and 65 - .18 .39 0 1
income low low income (self-deﬁniton) - .49 .5 0 1
income middle middle income (self-
deﬁniton)
- .37 .48 0 1
education basic basic or no education - .22 .41 0 1
education sec. secondary education - .49 .5 0 1
unemployed 1 if unemployed - .11 .31 0 1
employed 1 if partially or fully em-
ployed
- .52 .5 0 1
Firm-speciﬁc controls
size small 1 if 5 to 20 employees - .5 .5 0 1
size medium 1 if 20 to 100 employees - .32 .46 0 1
manufacturing 1 if ﬁrm is in manufactur-
ing sector
- .58 .49 0 1
services 1 if ﬁrm is in services sector - .3 .45 0 1
private domestic share in a ﬁrm of private
domestic owners
- 86.7 31.84 0 100
private foreign share in a ﬁrm of private
foreign owners
- 10.28 28.45 0 100
Note: Descriptions of variables, which are used in our
regressions. Abbreviations used: LG - local government, CG -
central government, GG - general government.
21There are several country control variables’ groups, which we include based on
the theoretical arguments described in Section 2. First, we include variables, which
characterize administrative structure of a country: average size of local government,
tiers dummies, and number of LG units at a lowest tier. We also control for the
level of country’s development (log(GDP per capita)), it’s openness (openness), ori-
gin of its legislature (legal origin), consumption needs of a general government (gov.
consumption), and the level of bureaucracy (start business, enforce contract) - a
standard set of variables used in empirical investigations on corruption. We also
control for a country’s heterogeneity by including such variables as religious frac-
tionalization, lingual fractionalization of a country’s population. Individual controls
included in the regressions are sex, age, education, income, and employment status.
Firm-speciﬁc controls that we use are size of a ﬁrm (number of employees), its sec-
tor (manufacturing, services or other), and its ownership (domestic private, foreign
private or state).
6 Main results
Our main results are presented in Table 5. Here decentralization index is used as
our main measure of decentralization, while dependent variables are our 5 measures
of corruption. A linear probability (OLS) estimates are reported in the columns
(1), (4), (7), (10), (13) and (14) - for all 5 variables. In columns (2) and (8) the
coeﬃcients from probit regressions are reported, when paid bribe and informal gift
are dependent variables. Since, the coeﬃcients in the probit model do not have a
direct interpretation (except for their direction, relative magnitude and statistical
signiﬁcance), in columns (3) and (9) we report average partial eﬀects of each variable
on corruption, evaluated at the corresponding samples. Columns (5) and (11) report
tobit estimates, when bribe burden and bribe%sales are used as dependent variables.
Similarly to probit estimates, there is no direct interpretation for tobit estimates
(again, except their direction, statistical signiﬁcance and relative magnitude). Since
the share of corner responses is so high (70-90% are 0’s) in the sample, the estimates
cannot be directly compared with OLS estimates. Therefore, in columns (6) and
(12) we report average partial eﬀects of each variable, evaluated at the corresponding
samples. Columns (13) and (14) report OLS estimates when the dependent variables
are corruption perceptions in 2005 and 2007 correspondingly. For comparison, in the
second and third row of the table (in italic) we also report the resulting coeﬃcients,
when LG expenditure decentralization and auxilliary ecentralization index are used
as the measures of decentralization, all other regressors the same. In all speciﬁcations
(were feasible) we allow for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation between errors
inside one country.
22Table 5: Results of the main estimation
paid bribe bribe burden informal gift bribe%sales corr. perception
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
est. method lpm pr ape lpm tob ape lpm pr ape lpm tob ape 2005 2007
dec. index, main -0.13 -0.93 -0.17 -6.01* -29.39 -2.99 -0.68* -2.25* -0.55* -4.55 -17.15 -4.62 4.14** 5.03***
(0.16) (0.89) (0.16) (3.32) (32.59) (7.45) (0.38) (1.25) (0.31) (3.28) (12.63) (8.53) (1.83) (1.51)
exp. decentr. -0.04 -0.26 -2.37* -8.26 -0.25 -0.93 -3.11* -8.27 1.10 1.48
(0.09) (0.43) (1.41) (15.38) (0.17) (0.58) (1.71) (6.58) (1.01) (0.92)
dec. index, aux. -0.02 -0.24 -3.08 -6.78 -0.29 -1.16* -2.83* -10.04 1.96 2.39**
(0.11) (0.52) (1.91) (19.27) (0.19) (0.62) (1.59) (6.46) (1.24) (1.10)
1 LG tier 0.04 0.30 0.06 -0.54 11.74 1.36 -0.10** -0.33** -0.07*** 0.34 0.37 0.10 0.83** 0.78**
(0.04) (0.20) (0.04) (0.60) (7.90) (1.95) (0.04) (0.14) (0.03) (0.44) (2.03) (1.08) (0.39) (0.35)
2 LG tiers 0.00 0.12 0.02 -1.24** 4.88 0.50 -0.11** -0.32*** -0.08*** -0.07 -1.50 -0.4 0.41 0.35
(0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.56) (4.35) (1.48) (0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.29) (1.47) (0.69) (0.27) (0.22)
UK legal origin -0.04 -0.21 -0.04 -2.24** -11.20 -1.06 -0.05 -0.15 -0.03 -1.48*** -6.50*** -1.75 -0.09 -0.04
(0.04) (0.24) (0.04) (0.89) (8.71) (2.67) (0.05) (0.17) (0.04) (0.48) (2.31) (1.14) (0.35) (0.31)
start business -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.14** -0.82 -0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.24 0.07 -0.06 -0.04
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.07) (0.80) (0.17) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.26) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04)
enforce contract -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.21 0.02 0.01** 0.03** 0.01** -0.05* -0.24* -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.44) (0.12) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.15) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
gov. consumption -0.01*** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.09** -1.35*** -0.14 -0.00 -0.01* -0.00* -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.42) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01)
log (GDP/capita) -0.05*** -0.30*** -0.05*** -0.58* -12.0*** -1.22* -0.02 -0.12** -0.03** -0.26 -1.16* -0.31 0.91*** 0.78***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.32) (3.08) (0.71) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.16) (0.70) (0.57) (0.14) (0.11)
ﬁrm, ind. controls ind ind ind ind ind ind ﬁrm ﬁrm ﬁrm ﬁrm ﬁrm ﬁrm no no
dataset GCB GCB GCB GCB GCB GCB WBES WBES WBES WBES WBES WBES CPI CPI
standard errors cluster cluster margeﬀ cluster cluster bootstr. cluster cluster margeﬀ cluster cluster bootstr. robust robust
observations 36821 36821 36821 36296 36296 32775 32775 32775 33824 33824 118 118
R-squared 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.86 0.82 0.86
# countries 57 57 60 60 111 111
Note ∗ - signiﬁcant at 10% level, ∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 1% level. Dependent variable: columns (1)-(3) - paid bribe; columns (4)-(6) - paid bribe; columns
(7)-(9) - informal gift; columns (10)-(12) - bribe%sales; column (13) - corruption perception, 2005; column (14) - corruption perception, 2007 (see deﬁnitions in Table 2). Estimation
methods: columns (1), (4), (7), (10), (13), (14) - OLS; columns (2), (8) - probit; columns (5), (11) - tobit with lower limit at 0; columns (3), (6), (9), (12) - average partial eﬀects
over sample. Standard errors are reported in brackets: columns (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (8), (10), (11) - clustered by country and heteroscedasticity robust; columns (13) (14) -
heteroscedasticity robust; columns (3), (9) - estimated by margeﬀ ; columns (6), (12) - cluster bootstraped (500 iterations). Additional controls are included in all regressions, but
not reported here due to a lack of space. These are regional dummies, year dummies, individual and ﬁrm controls, population, openness, fractionalization, # of units, LG population
size, LG area.
2
3As Table 5 shows, decentralization measured by main decentralization index has
a negative eﬀect on corruption in all speciﬁcations and for all datasets that we use.
When clustered by country standard errors are used the eﬀect is only marginally
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.05-0.15) when dependent variables are bribe
burden, informal gift, or bribe % sales, while for paid bribe it is practically insigniﬁ-
cant. However, the average size of a cluster in our data is 646 observations for GCB
sample, and 546 observations for WBES sample, while the number of clusters is 57
in GCB, and 60 in WBES. As is argued by Wooldridge (2006), for relatively small
number of clusters and big size of clusters inference based on clustered standard
errors may be too conservative (meaning that it produces too big standard errors).9
In Table 6 we report the results from identical (to the ones in Table 5) regres-
sions, but we do not cluster the standard errors (columns (1), (3), (5), (7)). We show
only results from OLS, but the results from probit and tobit have the same property:
while the point-estimates of the decentralization’s eﬀect on corruption remain the
same, the standard errors are now much smaller. In all above-mentioned speciﬁ-
cations decentralization has negative and strongly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on
corruption.
Ignoring countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects completely - as it is done in columns (1), (3), (5),
(7) of Table 6 - would be too optimistic. As an alternative, we use the inference for
a clustered data proposed by Donald and Lang (2006). For that we just average our
data by country (take means of every series by country) and run the same regressions
as before, only with the number of observations, which corresponds to a number of
countries in our samples. The standard OLS standard errors would be then correct.
The results for each of our four measures of corruption are presented in columns
(2), (4), (6), (8) of Table 6. The eﬀect of decentralization on corruption remains
negative in all four speciﬁcations. It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 though only if
dependent variables are bribe burden and informal gift. These results are supported
by the ones in the columns (13)-(14) from Table 5, when we run a regression on a
cross-country sample and use TI corruption perception as our measure of corruption.
While the eﬀect of decentralization on corruption is not statistically signiﬁcant
in all of our speciﬁcations, Tables 5 and 6 present a strong evidence that it is
strictly negative. First, the point-estimates of the eﬀect are negative in all our
speciﬁcations, and they are insensitive to the inclusion of additional regressors on
the right hand side. Second, even if conservative clustered standard errors are used,
it is statistically signiﬁcant on the margin in certain speciﬁcations, and this fact is
supported by the Donald and Lang (2006) approach. The strongest (statistically)
evidence is for the amount of bribes that households pay (bribe burden), and for
the frequency of bribery among ﬁrms (informal gift). Therefore, both households
and ﬁrms are aﬀected by decentralization. As our cross-country regressions suggest,
it also has a positive eﬀect on corruption perception of a country among experts
(which is higher for less corrupted countries).
Decentralization also has signiﬁcant economic eﬀect on corruption. From column
(2) of Table 5 it follows that a 0.1 increase in decentralization of local governments
- which eﬀectively means extending their expenditures and own revenues by 10
9Diﬀerence in cluster sizes (646 vs. 546) may also explain why standard errors in regressions
run on GCB sample are in general higher that the ones from WBES sample
24Table 6: Results of the main estimation - alternative inference
paid bribe bribe burden informal gift bribe%sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
est. method lpm dl lpm dl lpm dl lpm dl
dec. index, main -0.13*** -0.09 -6.01*** -13.10** -0.68*** -1.50** -4.55*** -7.50
(0.04) (0.31) (1.48) (5.17) (0.07) (0.70) (1.07) (9.50)
exp. decentraliza-
tion
-0.04* -0.02 -2.37*** -4.66 -0.25*** -0.61** -3.11*** -3.94
(0.02) (0.16) (0.65) (2.84) (0.03) (0.24) (0.46) (3.33)
dec. index, aux. -0.02 -0.02 -3.08*** -6.51* -0.29*** -0.83*** -2.83*** -3.17
(0.02) (0.19) (0.81) (3.39) (0.03) (0.27) (0.49) (3.94)









Note ∗ - signiﬁcant at 10% level, ∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 1% level. Dependent variable:
columns (1)-(2) - paid bribe; columns (3)-(4) - paid bribe; columns (5)-(6) - informal gift; columns (7)-(8) -
bribe%sales (see deﬁnitions in Table 2). Estimation methods: columns (1), (3), (5), (7) - OLS on the whole sample
(lpm); columns (2), (4), (6), (8) - OLS on the averaged data from the corresponding sample (see Wooldridge
(2006)). Standard errors are reported in brackets: columns (1), (3), (5), (7)- heteroscedasticity robust; columns
(2), (4), (6), (8) - standard. Other controls included in the regressions are identical to that of in Table 5.
percentage points - in an average country would reduce the average probability of
a household paying a bribe by 1.7 percentage points. While this may seem a small
number, one should note that the mean probability of paying a bribe in the sample is
11%, and 1.7 percentage points represent more than a 15% decrease in the frequency
of bribery among households. As for the bribe burden, empowering local governments
by 10 percentage points more would decrease the bribe burden (share of his/her
incomes spent on bribes) for an average person by about 0.30 percentage points,
which is more than a quarter decrease from an average bribe burden in the sample.
The eﬀect of decentralization on frequency and amount of bribery is much stronger
for ﬁrms than for households. Columns (9) and (12) from Table 5 suggest that a 10
percentage points increase in LG decentralization is associated with 5.5 percentage
points decrease in frequency of ”informal gifts” and 0.74 percentage points decrease
in share of annual sales alloted to bribery. Finally, 10 percentage points increase in
decentralization would raise the corruption perception index in 2007 by 0.5 points,
which is equivalent for an average country to moving up by about 12 positions in
TI’s country ranking.
In Tables 5 and 6 - raws 2 and 3 (in italic) - we also report the results, when we use
other decentralization measures in identical regressions. We consider two additional
measures - a widely used in other literature LG expenditure decentralization and an
auxiliary decentralization index (see the deﬁnitions in Table 4. The eﬀect of LG
expenditure decentralization is smaller than the eﬀect of the main decentralization
index in all our speciﬁcations, even accounting for a higher mean of LG expenditure
decentralization. In most speciﬁcations, it is also less statistically diﬀerent from
0 (i.e. t-statistics are smaller). The biggest diﬀerence can be seen in the columns
(13)-(14), where corruption perception is used as a measure of corruption. There the
main decentralization index is shown to have a very signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, while
the eﬀect of LG expenditure decentralization is statistically and economically zero.
The behavior of the auxiliary decentralization index is similar to the one of LG
expenditure decentralization, which suggests that just decentralizing expenditures
25is generally not enough to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on a government’s integrity.
Increasing a government’s own revenues, taxation autonomy and ﬁnancing it with
unconditional formula-based transfers is an essential part of successful story.
In addition to average partial marginal eﬀects of decentralization, calculated in a
pooled sample of all countries, which may not be of particular interest, for variable
paid bribe we calculated marginal eﬀects of decentralization on corruption for an
average person in every single country from our sample. The results are reported in
Table 7. As one can see from the table, the eﬀect is very high for less developed (and
less decentralized) countries: Togo - -32, Senegal - -27, Paraguay - -28, Guatemala -
-27, Cameroon - -28, Cambodia - -29. At the same time, the eﬀect is close to 0 for
such countries as USA, UK, Canada. For Australia, Costa Rica, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, UK and USA the eﬀect is only
marginally statistically diﬀerent from 0.
6.1 Voice vs. exit
Our main speciﬁcations, which are reported in Table 5, do not allow us to disentan-
gle the channels through which decentralization may aﬀect corruption. The theory
names two major channels. First, decentralizing government brings power closer to
people, which makes it more controllable and thus accountable. This is so-called
”voice” argument. Second, decentralized local governments obtain more instruments
to compete with other governments and attract mobile residents or businesses. From
the other side, if the residents or businesses are dissatisﬁed with integrity at their
present jurisdiction, they can move to the other one. This is so-called ”exit” argu-
ment. In this section we test whether one of the channels - ”voice” or ”exit” - is
dominant.
The theoretical assumptions about a country for voice or exit arguments to work
are quite diﬀerent, which potentially allows to identify these eﬀects separately. Exit
of residents is possible only if they are mobile, i.e. can choose in which jurisdiction
to reside, and if they have options of where to exit. This is not needed for a voice
argument to work. Instead, under this argument, it is government’s closeness to
people that makes voice of the people ”louder” and thus behavior of the govern-
ment more accountable. For instance, abstracting from international mobility, such
country as Lichtenstein has quite bad premises for the exit argument to work (since
its residents simply do not have options of where to move inside the country), but
extremely good premises for the voice argument to work - after all, the central gov-
ernment of Lichtenstein is closer to its people (in terms of population over which it
governs) than most of the local governments elsewhere.
26Table 7: Decentralization eﬀect on corruption by country
country dec. index av. eﬀect 95% conf. interval country dec. index av. eﬀect 95% conf. interval
Argentina .021 -.15 -.3 -.00 Australia .045 -.04 -.09 .01
Bolivia .045 -.21 -.4 -.02 Bulgaria .025 -.16 -.3 -.02
Cambodia .004 -.29 -.55 -.03 Cameroon .001 -.28 -.56 -.01
Canada .1 -.02 -.03 -.00 Colombia .117 -.18 -.33 -.02
Costa Rica .014 -.13 -.26 .00 Denmark .313 -.02 -.04 -.00
Dominican Repub-
lic
.006 -.19 -.37 -.00 Ecuador .054 -.19 -.36 -.02
Finland .226 -.07 -.14 -.00 France .126 -.04 -.1 .00
Georgia .125 -.18 -.3 -.05 Germany .062 -.04 -.08 -.00
Ghana .016 -.25 -.47 -.03 Greece .01 -.09 -.17 -.01
Guatemala .012 -.27 -.52 -.01 Iceland .19 -.06 -.12 .00
India .019 -.16 -.29 -.02 Indonesia .128 -.23 -.43 -.01
Ireland .089 -.04 -.08 .00 Japan .139 -.04 -.07 -.01
Kenya .02 -.26 -.48 -.03 Korea, Rep. .12 -.05 -.09 -.01
Lithuania .075 -.13 -.26 -.00 Malaysia .008 -.11 -.22 -.00
Mexico .009 -.22 -.43 -.01 Moldova .0451 -.21 -.35 -.06
Nicaragua .003 -.25 -.49 -.01 Nigeria .114 -.26 -.47 -.04
Norway .174 -.03 -.05 -.01 Pakistan .08 -.18 -.33 -.3
Panama .005 -.13 -.28 .02 Paraguay .014 -.28 -.55 -.01
Peru .076 -.14 -.28 -.01 Philippines .066 -.16 -.3 -.02
Poland .113 -.09 -.17 -.01 Portugal .059 -.07 -.16 .01
Romania .09 -.16 -.29 -.03 Russian Federation .124 -.17 -.31 -.03
Senegal .012 -.27 -.5 -.04 South Africa .086 -.08 -.15 -.00
Spain .075 -.07 -.13 .00 Switzerland .147 -.05 -.1 .00
Thailand .015 -.1 -.17 -.03 Togo .01 -.32 -.59 -.04
Turkey .01 -.14 -.26 -.02 Ukraine .114 -.17 -.31 -.02
United Kingdom .034 -.02 -.05 .01 United States .126 -.01 -.02 .00
Uruguay .061 -.13 -.26 -.00
Note For every country in the sample (paid bribe as a dependent variable), marginal eﬀect of decentralization on corruption for an average person is shown. Column (2) -
point-estimates; columns (3), (4) - 95% conﬁdence interval.
2
7Our speciﬁcation strategy in this section is the following:
corruption = β0 + β1 ∗ decentr. + β2 ∗ decentr. ∗ mobility+
+ β3 ∗ decentr. ∗ exit options + other controls. (10)
Including the interaction of decentralization and mobility in (10) allows us to
test for signiﬁcance of the exit argument. Indeed, if β2 > it means that the eﬀect
of decentralization on corruption increases with mobility of ﬁrms and residents.
Following the theoretical discussion above this may happen only if exit argument
for decentralization works. The same holds for β3. Therefore, under speciﬁcation
(10) β2 + β3 would be a measurement for ”exit” part of decentralization eﬀect on
corruption. β1 then encompasses the ”voice” part of the eﬀect (together with other
possible channels, through which decentralization may aﬀect corruption).
The estimation results of our new speciﬁcation are shown in Table 9. There, as a
proxy for residents and ﬁrms mobility we use average area of LG unit (based on the
presumption, that moving is costly, when the distance is longer - e.g. moving from
state to state is more expensive that moving from county to county). As a proxy for
number of exit options we use number of LG units in a country (shown to have an
eﬀect on corruption in Arikan (2004)). We run 5 diﬀerent speciﬁcations, each time
a diﬀerent corruption variable is used. To ease the interpretation we restrict current
analysis only to OLS, ignoring the non-linear nature of dependent variable.
It can be seen from Table 9 that none of the 5 speciﬁcations provide a conclusive
evidence in favor of existence of ”exit” eﬀect on practice. Coeﬃcient near dec. in-
dex, which corresponds to our β1 from (10), remains economically and statistically
signiﬁcant in almost all speciﬁcations, but neither β2, coeﬃcient near dec.index*LG
area, nor β3, coeﬃcient near dec.index*# LG units, have predicted sign and eco-
nomical signiﬁcance. β3 > 0 in all speciﬁcations (statistically signiﬁcant only in 2
of them), which is contrary to what we expected, and its magnitude is virtually 0.
β2 is greater than 0, which is what we expected, in only one speciﬁcation (third
column) of 5. Therefore, from the data that we have, we cannot conclude that the
decentralization works through an exit channel.
6.2 Does politics matter?
Our main decentralization index is based solely on the ﬁscal side of the decentraliza-
tion: expanse of local expenditures is adjusted on how much of these expenditures
are ﬁnanced by own local revenues or by unconditional transfers. So far, we did
not include political indicators in our analysis. Yet, it may make a big diﬀerence
whether the local money - no matter how autonomously obtained - are spent by
someone, who is elected by local people, or someone who is appointed from above
(and what is more important, can be dismissed from above in case of disobedience).
In this section we test whether politics matter when local ﬁnances are taken into
account. The speciﬁcation we are testing is similar to that in Section 6.1:
corruption = β0 + β1 ∗ decentr. + β2 ∗ decentr. ∗ polit decentr.+
+ β3 ∗ polit decentr. + other controls. (11)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dec. index -0.25*** -14.76** 3.45 -17.8 -0.78
-0.06 -5.72 -2.74 -28.07 -3.59
dec.index*(# units) 0.00*** 0 0 0.00* 0
0 0 0 0 0
LG area 0.01*** 0.54 -0.06* 0.22 0
0 -0.36 -0.03 -0.37 -0.01
dec.index*LG area -0.23*** -10.07 0.85* -6.01 0.1
-0.05 -6.09 -0.5 -7.14 -0.12
dec.index*GDP/capita 0.06 0 0 0.00** 0.00***
-0.05 0 0 0 0
# units -0.00*** 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1 tier -0.15*** -6.78 -0.12** -0.45 0.31
-0.06 -6.64 -0.05 -0.53 -0.39
2 tiers -0.17*** -7.47 -0.16*** -0.29 0.12
-0.05 -6.51 -0.05 -0.37 -0.23
3 tiers -0.17*** -6.46
-0.05 -6.71
UK legal origin -0.08*** -3.05*** -0.02 -0.05 0.36
-0.01 -0.86 -0.06 -0.54 -0.29
fractionalization 0 -0.36 0 0.23** -0.03
0 -0.29 -0.02 -0.11 -0.08
start business -0.01*** -0.17* 0 0.13 -0.09**
0 -0.09 0 -0.08 -0.04
enforce contract -0.00*** 0 0.01* -0.02 -0.03
0 -0.06 0 -0.04 -0.02
# countries 54 56 56 56 101
Note ∗ - signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 3% level, ∗∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 1% level. Dependent variable:
column (1) - paid bribe; columns (2) - paid bribe; columns (3) - informal gift; columns (4) - bribe%sales; column
(5) - corruption perception, 2007 (see deﬁnitions in Table 2). Estimation method: linear probability (OLS).
Standard errors are reported in brackets: columns (1), (2), (5) - heteroscedasticity robust; columns (3), (4) -
clustered by country. Additional controls are included in all regressions, but not reported here due to a lack of
space. These are regional dummies, year dummies, individual and ﬁrm controls, population, openness, log (GDP
per capita), # of units, LG population size.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dec.index -0.81** -53.58*** -2.39*** -38.25*** 30.86**
-0.39 -13.82 -0.6 -10.35 -12.97
LG exec. el. 0.14*** 0.04 -0.10*** -2.12*** 0.54
-0.02 -0.87 -0.02 -0.51 -0.82
dec.index*LG exec. el. -3.60*** 50.14*** 2.92*** 36.93*** -0.82
-0.45 -16.21 -0.4 -10.32 -14.13
LG indep. -0.07*** -3.24*** -0.13*** -1.67* 2.21*
-0.02 -0.69 -0.03 -0.94 -1.12
dec.index*LG indep. -1.56*** 18.88** 0.79* 28.24** -16.59
-0.26 -8.99 -0.41 -13.17 -13.61
LG direct dem. -0.04 -3.03*** 0.27*** 1.22 -0.46
-0.03 -1.03 -0.04 -0.92 -1.05
dec.index*LG dir.dem. 0.74** -7.54 -5.97*** -13.24 14.84
-0.31 -11.15 -0.72 -16.19 -11.69
LG leg. el. -0.25*** -2.18** 0.08*** -0.06
-0.03 -1.01 -0.02 -0.57
dec.index*LG leg.el. 4.58*** -9.97 0.12 -20.79
-0.69 -22.78 -0.54 -14.07
LG area -0.02** 1.20*** -0.01*** -0.04*** 0.01
-0.01 -0.29 0 -0.01 -0.01
dec.index*LG area 0.15 -21.35*** -0.25*** 0.15 4.06***
-0.12 -4.37 -0.05 -1.86 -1.46
1 tier 0.17** -17.95*** -0.02** 0.55 -0.26
-0.07 -3.12 -0.01 -0.45 -0.46
2 tiers 0.12* -18.46*** -0.06*** -0.28 -0.18
-0.07 -3 -0.01 -0.36 -0.32
3 tiers 0.1 -17.67***
-0.07 -3.01
UK legal origin -0.04*** -2.98*** 0.04** 0.81 -0.12
-0.01 -0.45 -0.02 -0.57 -0.35
fractionalization 0.04*** -0.50*** 0.02*** 0.31*** -0.07
0 -0.16 0 -0.1 -0.12
start business -0.01*** -0.06 0.01*** 0.08** -0.10*
0 -0.04 0 -0.03 -0.05
enforce contract 0.00*** -0.04 0.01*** 0 -0.03
0 -0.03 0 -0.02 -0.03
log (GDP/capita) -0.07*** -0.19 0.31
-0.01 -0.22 -0.24
Observations 33925 33459 27217 28773 72
R-squared 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.93
# countries 54 56 56 56 101
Note ∗ - signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 3% level, ∗∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 1% level. Dependent variable:
column (1) - paid bribe; columns (2) - paid bribe; columns (3) - informal gift; columns (4) - bribe%sales; column
(5) - corruption perception, 2007 (see deﬁnitions in Table 2). Estimation method: columns (1), (2), (4), (5) -
linear probability (OLS); column (3) - probit (average partial eﬀects are reported). Standard errors are reported in
brackets: columns (1), (2), (5) - heteroscedasticity robust; columns (3), (4) - clustered by country. Additional
controls are included in all regressions, but not reported here due to a lack of space. These are regional dummies,
year dummies, individual and ﬁrm controls, population, openness, # of units, LG population size.
30Again, if political decentralization of local governments matters than the more de-
centralized they are (politically) the bigger should be the eﬀect of decentralization
(ﬁscal) on corruption, i.e. β2 should be greater than 0. In addition, politics can
work independently from ﬁscal decentralization. In this case β3 should be diﬀerent
from 0.
We include all political decentralization variables in regression. Deﬁned in Sec-
tion 3, they are LG independence, LG executive election, LG direct democracy,
and LG legislative election. We also include interactions of these variables with our
main decentralization index. The results are depicted in Table 9. Again, we run 5
diﬀerent speciﬁcations - each corresponds to a diﬀerent corruption variable.
The results reported in Table 9 deﬁnitely suggest that the political decentral-
ization is an important factor aﬀecting corruption, even if ﬁscal decentralization is
controlled for. In all speciﬁcations dec.index still has economically and statistically
signiﬁcant negative impact on corruption. Yet, each political variable in the regres-
sion adds up some new information. In only 2 of 5 speciﬁcations election of executive
at a local level increases the eﬀect of decentralization on corruption. At the same
time, 2 of 5 speciﬁcations suggest that when LG are not decentralized (ﬁscally) lo-
cal election of executive may actually worsen corruption (coeﬃcient near LG exec.
el. is positive in (1) and (2)). LG independence is shown to have an independent
signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on corruption in all 5 speciﬁcations. The interaction be-
tween decentralization index and LG independence does not work as well suggesting
that nominal independence of LG matters less when local governments are inde-
pendent ﬁscally. Availability of direct democracy mechanisms in local governance
generally (in almost all speciﬁcations) improves the situation with corruption both
independently and in interaction with ﬁscal decentralization. Finally, local election
of legislative council does not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on corruption. A
possible reason for that may come from the pure statistics - very few countries in
the world (20% of our sample) restrict elections of councils at a local level. A lack
of variation in this variable may potentially blow up the variance of a corresponding
estimator making it hard to come to any conclusions.
7 Robustness discussion
The results from the previous sections suggest a strong and robust negative cor-
relation between decentralization in a country and extent of corruption in it. The
statistical estimation of the causal eﬀect is however more complicated. There are
at least two problems with that. First, even if decentralization is exogenous in our
setup, the right hand side of our regressions still contains variables, which are clearly
endogenous (like GDP per capita). This drags estimator of decentralization eﬀect to
inconsistency. The second problem is more serious: both extent of corruption and
decentralization could be driven by the same omitted process, say ”benevolency” of
a government, or a ”level of country’s development”. Then the eﬀect we estimate
in our main speciﬁcations is inconsistent, and identiﬁes only a strong correlation
rather than causal eﬀect.
Further we analyze both of the problems in more detail.
317.1 Endogenous right hand side variables
To isolate the eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in a country we need to control
for wealth of the country (and some other macroindicators, which apparently are
correlated with both decentralization and corruption). However, no one would argue,
that the wealth of the country heavily depends on extent of corruption in it (and
more generally, on the ”quality of institutions”). In fact, wealth and corruption may
be viewed as jointly determined: rich people ﬁght more against corruption, while
corruption makes people poor. In this situation, even if the decentralization itself is
exogenous in our analysis, its eﬀect may be estimated inconsistently.
The problem may be relieved by the establishment of the direction of inconsis-
tency. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that wealth and corruption are negatively
correlated - the richest nations in the world are the least corrupted. At the same
time, rich people are more mobile as well as they are more demanding to government
and willing to make its decisions as close to their preferences as possible. If that
is the case - and the data clearly point in this direction - then the correlation be-
tween wealth and decentralization is positive even after controlling for other factors,
which are included in the right hand side of our regressions. A general econometric
result states that if an error and endogenous variable are negatively correlated, and
variable of interest and endogenous variable are positively correlated controlling for
other variables in a regression, than OLS estimator underestimates the true coeﬃ-
cient near the variable of interest. Our case quite possibly ﬁts all needed conditions
of this result, and therefore we may conclude that OLS estimates of our coeﬃcient
near decentralization are smaller than the actual coeﬃcient if GDP per capita is
included in the regressions (which is the case in all speciﬁcations).
A similar reasoning concerns a possible measurement error in our measurement
of decentralization. The possibility of the measurement error is high, since the data
are very scarce and many of the data points are roughly estimated. Part of our
reasoning for usage of composite indexes rather than separate variables is because
this way measurement errors may oﬀset each other. However, chances are that
the errors are present. Assuming that they satisfy classical assumptions (i.e. they
are uncorrelated with the variables in regressions), our OLS estimates suﬀer from
”attenuation” bias. A general econometrics result is that, again, ”attenuation” bias
causes OLS estimates may understate true relationship.
7.2 Endogenous decentralization
A more serious threat to our estimates of an eﬀect of decentralization on corruption
is that these two variables may be caused by the same omitted process or variable,
which would mean that decentralization is endogenous. Indeed, such a claim is quite
possible, since it is government, which is exposed to corruption, and it is government,
that designs and decides on decentralization. One possible relief in our situation is
that we run a petty corruption (mostly on the local level) on decentralization, which
is generally decided on the central government level. However, it is hard to believe
that these levels are independent.
It is possible to correct the endogeneity of decentralization if we assume that
both corruption and decentralization are driven by a variable, which is ﬁxed in time
32(at least, in a span of few years). A ”level of development” or ”cultural values of a
government” could be such variables. Then, if we have measurements of corruption
and decentralization for consecutive periods the ﬁxed eﬀect can be diﬀerenced out.
We do not have the same measurements of corruption and decentralization for
two or more periods. The data on decentralization collected by us is for 2005 only,
and WBES and GCB datasets, from which we draw our corruption measures, are
cross-sectional (at least, those which are available to us). However, we construct a
new decentralization index for 2000 from the data, which is available at the D. Treis-
man’s web site (and used in Fan et al. (2009)). We also use Corruption Perception
Index from 2000 as an alternative proxy for corruption in 2000. Having diﬀerent
proxies for the same variables in two periods may also help to eliminate ﬁxed eﬀect
from a regression. Indeed, suppose we have two equations:


















t2 are two diﬀerent proxies for corruption in two diﬀerent periods,
dect1, dec
′
t2 - are two proxies for decentralization, c - is the ﬁxed eﬀect that we want
to eliminate, X - are some other controls, ǫ and ǫ
′ are errors, which are assumed to
be uncorrelated with each other.
We can express c from (13) and insert the expression in (12). We obtain:


















Under our assumptions, β1 can be consistently estimated from (14), since ǫ
′ and













If we take cort1 to be, say, bribe burden, dect1 to be our main decentralization index,
cor
′
t2 to be CPI in 2000, and dec
′
t2 to be decentralization index in 2000, then we
expect β1 < 0, β
′′
2 < 0, and −β
′′
3 > 0.
The results of our estimation are presented in Table 10. We run 4 diﬀerent
speciﬁcations - 1 for each corruption variable except corruption perception. Further
we use two decentralization indexes for 2005 - our main dec. index and auxiliary
dec.index, deﬁned in Table 4.
The results in Table 10 are inconclusive. All our expectations hold only in one
speciﬁcation - when informal gift is used as a dependent variable. In the ﬁrst spec-
iﬁcation coeﬃcients mostly have predicted sign, but are statistically insigniﬁcant.
In speciﬁcations (2) and (4) decentralization of 2000 has the opposite sign to what
we would expect. Even when signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient near dec. index, 2005 is
much smaller than the one reported in our main speciﬁcation, suggesting that some
part of the correlation between corruption and decentralization is driven by some
omitted variable.
There may be several reasons for such twofold results. First, the data on de-
centralization - both for 2000 and 2005 - are very noisy. For most of the countries
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-0.02*** 0.05*** -0.36*** -0.01***
0 -0.02 -0.01 0
exp. dec., 2000 -0.01 -0.58* 3.35***
-0.04 -0.3 -0.63
aux. dec. index -1.77***
-0.29
aux. dec. index, 2000 -0.10***
-0.02
Observations 23301 23079 25254 23408
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02
Note ∗ - signiﬁcant at 5% level, ∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 3% level, ∗∗∗ - signiﬁcant at 1% level. Dependent variable:
column (1) - paid bribe; columns (2) - paid bribe; columns (3) - informal gift; columns (4) - bribe%sales (see
deﬁnitions in Table 2). Estimation method: linear probability (OLS). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
are reported in brackets.
they are simply not reported. Therefore, severe measurement error could inhibit
any signs of predicted behavior. The same role could be played by a small variation
of decentralization in our main samples - GCB concentrates mostly on high income
countries, while WBES - on low income countries. However, there may be a problem
with the ﬁxed eﬀect estimation - ﬁxed variable, which drives both decentralization
and corruption, may be not that ﬁxed after all. In this case, an exogenous source of
variation for a change in decentralization is needed to provide consistent estimates.
8 Conclusion
This paper has pursued rigorous quantitative analysis to explore the impact of de-
centralization (empowering of local governments) on the incidence of corruption in a
sample of 182 countries. The paper has shown that decentralization, when properly
measured to mean moving government closer to people by empowering local govern-
ments, has a signiﬁcant negative (positive in the sense of good governance) eﬀect
on corruption regardless of the choice of the estimation procedures or the measures
of corruption used. In terms of various dimensions of decentralized governance, po-
litical decentralization matters even when ﬁscal decentralization is controlled for.
Further voice (political accountability ) is considered more important in combating
corruption than exit options made available though competition among jurisdictions.
Shah (2006)
References
Ahlin, C. (2000). Corruption, aggregate economic activity and political organization,
University of Chicago, processed.
34Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003).
Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8: 155–194.
Arikan, G. (2004). Fiscal decentralization: A remedy for corruption? International
Tax and Public Finance 11: 175–195.
Bardhan, P. and D. Mookherjee (2005). Decentralization, corruption and govern-
ment accountability: An overview. In S. Rose-Akerman (ed.), Handbook of Eco-
nomic Corruption, Edward Elgar Publishing.
Blanshard, O. and A. Schleifer (2000). Federalism with and without political cen-
tralization: China versus Russia, NBER working paper.
Boadway, R. and A. Shah (2009). Fiscal federalism: Principles and practice of multi-
order governance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Carbonara, E. (1999). Bureaucracy, corruption and decentralization, University of
Bologna working paper.
Crook, R. and J. Manor (2000). Democratic decentralization, OED Working Papers
series, Washington DC.
De Mello, L. and M. Barenstein (2001). Fiscal decentralization and governance - A
cross-country analysis, IMF working paper.
Dincer, O., C. Ellis, and G. Waddell (2006). Decentralization and yardstick compe-
tition, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=877470.
Donald, S. and K. Lang (2006). Inference with diﬀerence in diﬀerences and other
panel data, mimeo, University of Texas.
Fan, C., C. Lin, and D. Treisman (2009). Political decentralization and corruption:
Evidence from around the world. Journal of Public Economics 93: 14–34.
Fisman, R. and R. Gatti (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across
countries. Journal of Public Economics 83: 325–345.
Fiszbein, A. (1997). The Emergence of local capacity: Lessons from Colombia. World
Development 25 (7): 1029–1043.
Gurgur, T. and A. Shah (2002). Localization and corruption: Panacea or Pandora’s
Box? In E. Ahmad and V. Tanzi (eds.), Managing Fiscal Decentralization, Lon-
don, New York: Routledge Press, 46–67.
Huther, J. and A. Shah (1998). Applying a simple measure of good governance to
the debate on ﬁscal decentralization, World Bank Policy Research paper 1894.
Ivanyna, M. and A. Shah (2010). Index of decentralization, World Bank Institute,
unpublished paper.
Kuncoro, A. (2000). The impact of licensing decentralization on ﬁrm location choice:
The case of Indonesia, University of Indonesia. processed.
35Prud’homme, R. (1994). On the dangers of decentralization, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 1252.
Seabright, P. (1996). Accountability and decentralisation in government: An incom-
plete contracts model. European Economic Review 40 (1): 61–89.
Shah, A. (1998). Balance, accountability, and responsiveness: Lessons about decen-
tralization, World Bank Policy Research paper.
Shah, A. (2006). Corruption and decentralized public governance. In E. Ahmad
and G. Brosio (eds.), Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
5478–5498.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108:
599–617.
Tanzi, V. (1995). Fiscal federalism and decentralization: A review of some eﬃciency
and macroecoomic aspects, Annual World Bank Conference on Development Eco-
nomics.
Treisman, D. (1999). After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation
in Russia. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of corruption: A cross national study. Journal of
Public Economics 76 (3): 399–457.
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) (2008). Decentralization and local
democracy in the world. USA.
Wade, R. (1997). How infrastructure agencies motivate staﬀ: Canal irrigation in
India and the Republic of Korea. In A. Mody (ed.), Infrastructure Strategies in
East Asia, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Weingast, B. (1995). The Economic role of political institutions: Market preserving
federalism and economic growth. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
11: 1–31.
Wildasin, D. (1995). Comment on ’Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A review
of some eﬃciency and macroeconomic aspects’, Annual World Bank Conference
on Development Economics.
Wooldridge, J. (2006). Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics: An ex-
tended analysis, mimeo, Michigan State University.
36